Bergson argues for free will by showing that the arguments against it come from a confusion of different conceptions of time. As opposed to physicists' idea of measurable time, life is perceived in human experience as a continuous and immeasurable flow rather than as a succession of marked-off states of consciousness.

Bergson argues for free will by showing that the arguments against it come from a confusion of different conceptions of time. As opposed to physicists' idea of measurable time, life is perceived in human experience as a continuous and immeasurable flow rather than as a succession of marked-off states of consciousness.

Elias's examples are characteristically framed in broad terms and yet vividly depicted in precise detail...The idea of an evolving nature governed by its own rules is in turn enhanced by the cognitive and practical mastery over time and space, diminishing the fantasy-content of myth while advancing the reality-congruence of scientific knowledge."" --Canadian Journal of Sociolog...(展开全部)

Internationally known and one of the most influential philosophers of his day (and for a time almost a cult figure in France, where his lectures drew huge crowds), Henri Bergson (1859-41) led a revolu

Internationally known and one of the most influential philosophers of his day (and for a time almost a cult figure in France, where his lectures drew huge crowds), Henri Bergson (1859-41) led a revolu

Library of Liberal Arts title.

托马斯·罗伯特·马尔萨斯（1766—1834），英国经济学家，牧师，著名学者，主要研究领域为政治经济学和人口学。《人口原理》是他最重要的著作，对后世产生了重大影响。他在书中提出了重要的人口过剩问题，并预言，人口增长率是不可维持的，持续的人口增长最终会导致贫困。尽管本书引起了很大的争议，但其无疑是十八至十九世纪最重要的著作之一，影响深远，甚至达尔文和他的自然选择理论都受到其影响。

托马斯·罗伯特·马尔萨斯（1766—1834），英国经济学家，牧师，著名学者，主要研究领域为政治经济学和人口学。《人口原理》是他最重要的著作，对后世产生了重大影响。他在书中提出了重要的人口过剩问题，并预言，人口增长率是不可维持的，持续的人口增长最终会导致贫困。尽管本书引起了很大的争议，但其无疑是十八至十九世纪最重要的著作之一，影响深远，甚至达尔文和他的自然选择理论都受到其影响。

If we are to distinguish mere non-being from that which is not, yet may be, from that which was not, yet could have been, or from that which will not be, yet could become, we are committed in some way to grant being to possibilities. The possible is not actual; yet it is not nothing. What then could it be? What ontological status could it possess? In Contingency, Time, and Pos...(展开全部)

If we are to distinguish mere non-being from that which is not, yet may be, from that which was not, yet could have been, or from that which will not be, yet could become, we are committed in some way to grant being to possibilities. The possible is not actual; yet it is not nothing. What then could it be? What ontological status could it possess? In Contingency, Time, and Pos...(展开全部)